The management factor in acquisition performance by Hall, Peter D.
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll c*::,,5 ‘:+ . :‘i. 
1402711192 /;;" j. , ', 
p t 
'$ t, 
12;";,~,;;1' r;' 
3 ?; :, :,. r/ “+-m-4 
SWP 13/87 THE MANAGEMENT FACTOR IN ACQUISITION 
PERFORMANCE 
PETER D HALL 
Lecturer in Strategic Management 
and 
PROF DAVID NORBURN 
Professor in Strategic Management 
Cranfield School of Management 
Cranfield Institute of Technology 
Cranfield 
Bedford MK43 OAL 
United Kingdom 
(Tel: 0234-751122) 
(Fax: 0234 751806) 
Submitted to Business Policy annd Planning Division: 
1987 National Academy of Management Conference, New Orleans 
Copyright: Hall & Norburn, 1987 
PETER D. HALL DAVID NORBURN 
Lecturer in 
Strategic Management 
I;..; t’*‘.“- i ‘2 ‘: ,.I IL 4 
I 
\-.. ?ry c.c J 
THE MANAGEMENT FACTOR 
IN 
ACQUISITION PERFORMANCE 
Professor in 
Strategic Management 
Cranfield School of Management 
Cranfield Institute of Technology 
Cranfield, Bedford MK43 OAL 
England 
(Tel. No. 0234-751122) 
Submitted to Business Policy and Planning Division: 
1987 National Academy of Management Conference, New Orleans 
(c) Hall & Norburn, 1987 January 1987 
ABSTRACT 
This paper reviews theoretical development and empirical 
investigation into the performance of Mergers and 
Acquisitions. In parallel it reviews recent research which 
links the performance of organisations to the presence of an 
appropriate Corporate Culture. From these two theoretical 
platforms, the paper argues that the performance of 
acquisitions is determined by a match of culture and those 
organisational expectations which avoid post-acquisition 
managerial indigestion. 
The paper finally proposes a programme of research to 
measure the performance of acquisitions against the criteria 
laid down by the acquiring management, and to determine the 
impact of culture clashes on those acquisitions perceived to 
have failed. 
In addressing the issue of financial benefits from 
mergers and acquisitions, overall research findings are 
consistent, and suggest that if shareholders' wealth 
maximisation is the primary objective, the impact for 
acquiring companies shareholders is at best neutral (Meeks 
1977; Franks, Broyles 61 Hecht 1977; Firth 1980). Despite 
this, contemporary statistics from the United Kingdom show a 
continuing and widespread use of acquisition as a key 
element of corporate strategy, the average value of each 
having increased by nine times over the last decade 
(Business Monitor, 1984). 
In parallel with the llFourth WaveI' of acquisition 
activity (Hannah 1976) both conceptual and empirical 
momentum has linked corporate culture with organisation 
performance (Ansoff, 1979; Deal & Kennedy, 1982; Harrison, 
1972, 1978; Hofstede, 1980; Peters & Waterman, 1982), 
Corporate Culture being colloquially defined as "the way we 
do things around here" (Bower, 1966). 
Deal 61 Kennedy's (1982) study of eighty companies 
found eighteen with clearly articulated qualitative beliefs 
. . . "all were uniformly outstanding performers; we could find 
no correlation of any relevance amongst the other companies 
- some did O.K., some poorly, most had their ups and downs. 
We characterised the consistently high performers as strong 
culture companiesl~. 
Kitching (1967) identified variables such as the 
relative size of the companies, the market share position of 
the acquiree, the retention of acguiree management, and the 
post acquisition integration process, and related these 
variables to success as defined by the management of the 
acquiring company. Salter & Weinhold (1979) similarly 
decided that successful acquisition outcomes were due to the 
l~organisational structure and human resource skills of the 
acquirer coupled with latent synergistic possibilities81. 
These statements suggest that in unsuccessful 
acquisitions, either the expected benefits do not exist to 
meet the acquirers objectives or the release of the benefits 
is blocked in some way and the acquiring companies lack the 
management ability to achieve the release. The continuing 
popularity of acquisitions leads these authors to focus on 
this latter proposition. 
The purpose of this paper is firstly to review the 
"state of the art" of scholarship concerning mergers and 
acquisitions by classifying according to methodological 
dimensions, and secondly, to suggest a programme of research 
to investigate the potential importance of management within 
the process, a subject of increasing emphasis within the 
corporate world. 
Acquisition Performance: 
The findings of the major studies concerning the 
impact of mergers on corporate performance which relate 
entirely to publically-quoted companies are summarised in 
Table 1 below, from which five general .conclusions may be 
drawn: 
1. Returns to the shareholders of acquiring firms 
are at best slight and tend to disappear 
rapidly, and, at worst, are significantly 
negative. 
2. Returns to the shareholders of acquired firms 
are strongly positive. 
3. Gains and losses of victims and predators became 
a zero-sum. 
, .’ 
4. In certain cases a failed bid leads to improved 
stock market valuation. 
5. Acquisitions were unlikely to reduce risk. .,_ , 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Acquiring Companies: 
The work of Firth (1976); Ellert, (1976); Elgers 61 
Clark (1980); M ichel; Shaked & Yobaccio (1983); and Dodds & 
Quek, (1985); all found evidence of increases in share 
value and abnormal returns to the acquiring firm  in the 
period leading up to the announcement of the merger bid. 
Ellert (1976) found that although share values showed an 
overall appreciation of 8.5% over the 24 months pre- 
acguisition, share performance declined in the last seven 
months prior to the merger. Conversely, following the 
announcement a reduction of this initial gain was generally 
observed. Firth (1976, 1980), and Barnes (1978, 1984), 
identified a sharp decline immediately following the 
acquisition event while M ichel, Shaked C Yobaccio (1983), 
and Dodds & Quek (1985), found a more gradual decline taking 
up to 55 months to eliminate the earlier gain. 
Acquired Companies: 
General agreement exists that the shareholders of the 
company to be acquired do considerably better out of the 
deal. Franks, Broyles 61 Hecht (1977) found gains of 20% to 
the victim's shareholders in the three month period before 
an acquisition was announced. This led them to consider the 
possibility of lVinsider trading II leading to speculation in 
the victim's shares. Their work was confined to the Brewing 
Industry but was confirmed by Wansley, Lane & Yang (1983) in 
a study of 200 acquisitions where they identifed abnormal 
gains of 25% to the victims shareholders in the 40 days 
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before the acquisition announcement. Using Cumulative 
Average Returns (CAR), Halpern (1973) identified positive 
abnormal gains of 30.4% and Malatesta .(1982) showed gains of 
22.2% within the last two months before the acquisition. 
All of these studies confirm that the shareholders of 
acquired firms earned abnormal gains from the merger, a 
conclusion embraced by the British press in contemporary 
commentary on the resignations of two major arbitrageurs. 
Zero-sum: 
However, FirthIs (1980) study of 434 UK acquisitions 
concluded that no aggregate advantage accrued since the 
gains accruing to the victim were cancelled by the losses of 
the attacker. By adding the gains to the victims 
shareholders to the apparent long-term losses to the 
shareholders of the acquiring firms Franks, Broyles & Hecht 
(1977) similarly confirmed the Mandelker (1974) hypothesis 
of Perfectly Competitive Acquisition Markets which proposes 
that competition among acquiring firms will cause the value 
of expected benefits from merging to be paid to the 
shareholders of the firm being acquired. 
Bid Failure: 1 
FirthIs (1980) study found that unsuccessful 
attackers outperformed the market in the twelve months 
following the failed bid, a result supported by Dodd 
L Ruback (1977) who found that following the rejection of a 
bid, the target's shares failed to fall back to their pre- 
offer level. 
Risk: 
Mason P Goudzwaard (1976) Langetieg, Hangeu & Wichern 
(1980): and Lubatkin & O'Neill (1985); examined whether 
acquisitions were used to reduce the risk associated with a 
particular firm by managers. Lubatkin & O'Nei.11 (1985) 
conclude that while certain types of acquisitions can reduce 
systematic (market related) risk they are not an effective 
means of reducing unsystematic (firm related) and total 
risk. Indeed Langetieg, Hangeu 61 Wichern (1980) found that 
acquisitions tend to be associated with increased levels of 
systematic, unsystematic and total risk for the merged 
firms. Mason 61 Goudzwaard (1976) concluded that Unit Trusts 
and portfolios of Selected industry shares were a more 
effective way for shareholders to reduce their risk profile 
than the shares of conglomerate firms. 
MEASURING ACQUISITION PERFORMANCE 
Developed from the above, a major body of research 
has measured the financial performance of acquiring firms on 
the criterion that acquisition success would be reflected in 
short and medium term increases in shareholder wealth for 
which share price fluctuations compared with historic trends 
and industry norms have been used as constructs. Overall, 
by any traditional wealth or performance measure, 
acquisitions tend not to benefit the shareholders of the 
acquiring company in any way above the average. In 
aggregate there is no improvement in return, nor is there 
any decrease in risk which could not have been achieved by 
the individual investor. 
This general result is unspectacular and might lead 
to the conclusion that acquisitions do not pay. However, 
further analysis is necessary before coming to a final 
conclusion. Bergman's (1983) comprehensive review of 
acquisition performance measures shows how the use of the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and its variation 
Cumulative Average Residuals (CAR) as measures of 
acquisition performance have placed methodological 
constraints on researchers in several ways. 
Examination of small samples has led to a need 
for a period of l~clean~~ data around the merger 
event. The length of this period-has ranged 
from 2 years either side of the event (Fama, 
1976) to 5 years either side (Halpern 1973). 
In this context "clean@@ is taken to require 
the absence of any other acquisiton or major 
event which would distort the data. Yet Power 
(1983) and Kitching (1967) have linked 
acguisiton success to the knowledge achieved ' 
through practise. Thus the need for clean 
data biases the sample by eliminating those 
companies with a higher probability of success 
through experience. 
- The use of share price movements automatically 
limits the studies to publically quoted 
companies which by their nature are above 
average in size. Given that a sample chosen 
therefore is generally coupled with the need 
for the acquiree to be represented in a 
similar data base the net effect is that all 
studies have used as sample units those 
companies which can only be described as 
extremely large. 
- The small overall population of acquisitions 
has precluded attempts to group different 
types of acquisitions without coming up 
against statistical limitations and the 
"cleanI data problem identified above. 
Kitching (1974) looked at ways of using internal 
financial data e.g. return on investment, earnings growth 
and earnings per share before rejecting them for the 
following reasons: 
-.Destruction of numbers. 
Because accounting systems are integrated and 
files are destroyed after the acquisition, it 
is normally impossible to get the necessary 
data after one or two years. " 
- Distortion of numbers. 
Following an acquisition changes in accounting 
conventions, tax liabilities, transfer prices 
or head office charges, can lead to numbers 
changing their meaning 
- Changes in operation, 
After one or two years, operational changes 
can be so substantial that the company being 
measured no longer exists as a recognisible 
unit. 
Kitching finally concluded "A good measurement 
technique must recognise that management motives for making 
acquisitions differ and that the weight accorded to each 
motive differs. Thus today's perception of success or 
failure must be a composite measure setting current 
satisfaction levels against the original motivesH. 
Peters & Austen (1985) identify that Itperception is 
all there is II and that only by understanding what the 
purchasers perceives to be success can we record actual 
achievement. Continuing the search for acquisition 
triggers, Boucher (1980) in a study for the Federal Trade 
Commission identified 31 possible motives for acquisition. 
The top 12 as identified by respondents across two 
iterations of interviews are listed in Table 2. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Therefore in measuring the success of an acquisition 
it is proposed that the constructs for performance should be , 
the motives stated by the management-of the acquiring 
company. Boucher's list of motives will be used as a 
framework within the research programme for testing motives 
through the senior management team of the acquirer. 
When Levinson (1970) looked at merger performance, he 
contended that "some psychological reasons for merger not 
only constitute a major, if unrecognised, force towards 
merger but they also constitute the basis for many, if not 
most, disappointments and failures". He concluded that 
these hidden psychological reasons for acquisitions led to a 
condescending attitude towards the victim which results in 
efforts to manipulate and control. The use of Boucher's 
established framework will therefore be valuable in 
establishing true reasons for acquisition. 
CORPORATE CULTURE 
The relationship between Corporate Culture and 
Organisathon Success has been identified in recent years in 
both popular (Peters & Waterman, 1982) and scholarly 
literature (Kilmann, Saxton, Serpa, 1986). Most have 
provided examples of strong organistional cultures and make 
prescriptive comment for running successful organisations. 
Culture is becoming established as a relevant concept which 
is useful in understanding what makes organisations 
effective and unique. 
Jay Lorsch defines culture as: 
@I . . . the shared beliefs top managers in a company 
have about how they should manage themselves and 
other employees and how they should conduct their 
businessI@ (Lorsch, 1986), He also made the telling 
point that "these beliefs are often invisible to the 
top managers but have a major impact on their 
thoughts and actional'. 
Other definitions include: 
I1 a coherent system of assumptions and basic values 
which distinguish one group from another and orient 
its choices14 (Gagliardi, 1986). 
"the integrated pattern of human behaviour that 
includes thought, speech, action and artifacts and 
depends on man's capacity for learning and 
transmitting knowledge to succeeding generations'@ 
(Webstars New Collegiate Dictionary). 
"the way we do things around here" (Bower, 1966). 
@Ia set of expected behaviours that are generally 
supported within the groupI@ (Silverzweig & Allen, 
1976). 
"shared philosophies, ideologies, values, 
assumptions, beliefs, expectations, attitudes and 
norms that knit a community together" (Kilman, Saxton 
hi Serpa, 1986). 
Implicit in these definitions is the acceptance that 
while culture exists, it cannot be measured directly and the 
choice of appropriate constructs leads to variation of 
definition. As a result there is little, if any, empirical 
data that is clearly descriptive of existing organisation 
cultures. Culture remains largely an anecdotal concept as 
it has been applied to the corporate environment, and there 
have been few attempts to develop a systematic, efficient 
measure of organisational culture. 
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Two types of work have been conducted using culture 
as a predictor of success and may be categorised as: 
- culture and Strategy 
- culture and Performance 
The first grouping including Lewfn C Minton (1986): 
Kets de Vries & Miller (1986); Lorsch (1986): and Reynierse 
and Harker (1986), use a combination of structured 
interview, questionnaires and longitudinal observations to 
determine a profile of organisational behaviour in a wide 
variety of situations. From an examination of the 
organisation's stated competitive strategy, a profile of 
required organisational behaviour can also be determined. 
Comparison of actual versus desired behaviour lead to a 
focussed programme of organisational change. 
The second category includes the best sellers, 
Pascale & Athos (1981): Ouchi (1981); Peters L Waterman 
(1982) t in addition to that of Deal & Kennedy (1982); and 
Reynolds (1986). 
Peters & Waterman identified seven specific beliefs 
which were consistently held and stated in their study of 62 
"Excellenttt organisations. Deal C Kennedy, over a period of 
6 months, developed profiles of nearly 80 companies and 
found: 
- Only 25 had clearly articulated beliefs 
- Of these, two thirds (18 companies) had qualitative 
beliefs as opposed to financially oriented goals 
- The 18 companies with qualitative beliefs were 
uniformly outstanding performers and were 
characterised as strong culture companies. 
Some of the high performers in Peters & Waterman’s 
study also appear in Deal t Kennedy. 
Norburn (1986) tested the characteristics of top 
managers within the U.K.ls largest companies against the 
performance of those industries in which they were 
strategically competing. He found significant differences 
in management characteristics between industry sectors 
categorised as growth, turbulent and declining. This work 
extends the upper-echelon theory of Hambrick & Mason (1985) 
which posits that top mangement characteristics will, 
partially, predict organisational success. 'The significance 
of management style and corporate cultures within 
performance outcomes is therefore appropriate for further 
investigation 
While emphasis has been placed on the existence of a 
strong culture in successful organsations, there is also 
recognised a need for an t'appropriatetl culture. Lorsch, 
(1986) describes culture as "the invisible barrier to 
Strategic Change". Kilman, Saxton & Serpa (1986) subdivide 
the impact of culture on the organisation into: 
- Direction 
- Pervasiveness 
- Strength 
If the culture is causing the organisation to behave 
in ways which are contrary to the expressed strategy then 
the impact of the culture is in the wrong direction. 
However, this might be less damaging if different cultures 
are perceived by different members of the organisation (not 
pervasive) or if the members of the organisation do not feel 
compelled to follow the dictates of the culture (weak 
culture). Thus the culture has a positive impact when it 
points behaviour in the right direction, is widely shared 
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among members of the organisation and puts strong pressure 
on members to follow the established cultural guidelines. 
It will have a negative effect if it points in the wrong 
direction but may be neutralised either by weakness or lack 
of general acceptance. 
In the absence of outside influence the 
organisational culture is reinforced and perpetuated in a 
ltVirtuous Cyclett (Gagliardi, 1986) where the culture leads 
to cohesion and organisational efficiency which in turn, 
leads to the creation of a distinctive competence which 
creates economic success which strengthens the values and 
beliefs. 
However, when the problem solving alternatives 
offered by the culture prove unable to cope with changing 
environments, the Virtuous Cycle becomes a Vicious Cycle, 
which denies the obsolescence of the culture. Lack of 
success is then blamed on uncontrollable external forces or 
the behavour of specific groups or individuals in the 
Organisation. 
A similar Vicious Cycle can be identified where thd 
culture is perceived to be successful, the organisation is 
perceived to be successful, yet change of culture is 
required by a major external upheaval such as the 
appointment of a new leader or the organisation's 
acquisition by another. 
The change in culture caused by an acquisition may be 
real or perceived. In the case of perceived change the 
acquired company expects things to change and takes a 
defensive position until it is proved that there will not 
actually be a change of culture. However, a real change may 
be seen as a ttRevolution It which requires a complete 
rejection of existing values, or an nEvolutionn which can be 
absorbed within the existing values and culture. 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
The disappointing overall performance of acquisitions 
has led to a search for predictors of success, and the 
categorisation of acquisitions. 
This categorisation starts at the planning stage - 
opportunistic approach, research approach, combination 
approach (Fray, Gaylin 61 Dawn, 1984), continues through the 
timig of the acquisition process - industry peaks and i 
troughs (Beman, 19733 Bradley & Korn, 1981; Kumar, 1977; 
Lynch, 1971; McCarthy, 1963; Salter & Weinhold, 1979, 1982), 
and the method of payment- cash, stock or various 
combinations (Nielson, 1972; Allen, Oliver & Schwallie, 
1981). However, the most generally used classification 
method is to compare the industry relatedness of the 
acquirer and the acquiree - the degree of ttfitl@. Using this 
criterion, a summary of acquisition typology research is 
shown in Table 3. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Relatedness or degree of nfitlt between acquirer and 
acguiree has been used in different stages of the research 
into acguisition performance. 
The degree of industry relatedness was thought to 
explain acquisition success until the study of Cowling, 
Stoneman, and Cubbin (1979) demonstrated that the 
relationships held true only in high profit ,industries and 
not in low profit industries, thus linking both industry 
perfomance and acguisition performance. Kitching, (1967) 
identified a ttfitlt between company characteristics (size, 
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market share) in those acquisitions acknowledged as 
successful by the managers concerned. 
The review of the impact of Corporate Culture on 
organisational performance suggests the existence of a 
further ltfitlt in successful acquisitons, that being the fit 
between organisational values and behaviours. 
Although the significance of the managerial factor 
has been identified, insufficient empirical investigation 
has been conducted relative to the importance of ensuring . 
acquisition success. We therefore suggest four hypotheses 
as fruitful avenues for field research. 
HvDothesis 1 : Culture Match 
The existence of strong cultures in outstandingly 
successful organisations has been demonstrated (Deal & 
Kennedy, 1982) as has the mechanism to perpetuate and 
strengthen the culture even when faced with a need to change 
(Gagliardi, 1986). The need to change a culture as a result 
of an acquisition may be either Perceived (if the cultures 
match) or Real (if a new culture is required). The time 
required to achieve Real Cultural change may stretch to 
decades or generations (Lcrsch, 1986), leaving the acquired 
organisation in a vicious cycle of resistance and poor 
performance. 
HI. “The extent to which there exists a /it between the Culture o/ Ihe acquiring 
organisation and lhe acquired organisation is directly correlated to the success 
of the acquisition”. 
Hvootheses 2 Autonomv 
In Hayes, (1981) study of the reasons why executives 
stay with their company after it has been acquired, 75% of 
those who stayed enjoyed a satisfactory level of autonomy 
from their new parent. This is consistent with the concept 
of a Perceived cultural change which allows the culture to 
settle back to its form after the initial. uncertainty. 
HZ. Where a lack oj /it in corporale culture exists, rhe success o/ the acquisition is 
determined by rhe amounl oj post-acquisition autonomy which is granted IO the 
acquired organisation. 
anniap 
Jemison & Sitkin (1986) state "The presence and use of 
ambiguity during the negotiating phase of an acquisition are 
often quite purposeful. But this same ambiguity when 
carried to the integration phase can be dysfunctional and 
reduce the chances for successful integration". Similarly, 
Hayes (1981) suggested that expectations of the future 
relationship are created during the negotiations. When 
these expectations are not met ex-post facto, executives 
become disillusioned, morale falls, performance declines and 
executives leave. This again is consistent with Coxls 
(1981) identification of the failure to link the negotiating 
team and the implementation team as a stumbling block to 
successful acquisition management. 
Further Kitching, (1967) and Cox, (1981) suggested that 
many of the problems of style and expectations can be 
anticipated and that the creation of false expectations can 
be eliminated by adequate planning of the management issues 
and implications of the acquisition. 
H3. The success of the acquisition is determined by the amount of pre-acquisition 
people planning that took place. 
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Hvnothesis 4 : Nenotiatlons 
Amongst the variables identifed by Kitching (1967) 
which related to the success of an acquisition were the 
retention of the acquiree management and the post- 
acquisition integration process. He suggested that the 
management of the acquiring firm would increase the 
likelihood of success by matching the availability of 
"managers of change I@ with the tasks of the newly merged 
enterprise'and by specifying at the outset the control 
system to be used and then sticking to it. 
However, in many acquisitions the tasks of analysing 
the potential of the target organisation and the way it will 
fit into the new structure is segmented because of its 
complexity. But this segmentation results in a lack of 
integration and a focus on strategic rather than 
organisational analysis (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986). Jemison 
& Sitkin also identify that the increasing momentum to close 
the deal can force premature closure and limit consideration 
of integration issues. 
H4. In success/u1 acquisitions a match in expectations exists in terms o/ personnel 
policy, remuneration. management style and degree of autonomy between the 
management teams of the acquiring company and the acquired company.’ 
CONCLUSIONS 
Theoretical and empirical research in Strategic 
Management has developed from typologies of strategy through 
strategy formulation mechanisms and is now focussing on the 
managerial implementation issues of managing continuous 
change. In contrast, research on Mergers and Acquisitions 
has explored the structural issues of typology and 
performance and although several studies have commented on 
the importance of management style, existing knowledge is 
limited. 
In seeking to develop a better insight into those 
aspects of reoearch on Mergers which are in need of 
empirical development this paper, whilst recognising the 
difficulties of linking behavioural and performance issues, 
suggests directions for future research which would extend 
the 'static' models of mergers to include the changing 
aspects of organisational style and culture. 
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TABLE 2 
MOTIVES FOR ACQUISITION 
MOTIVE 
Take advantage of awareness that a 
company is undervalued. 
Achieve growth more rapidly than by 
internal effort. 
Satisfy market demand for additional 
product services. 
Avoid risks of internal start-ups 
or expansion. 
Increase earnings per share. 
Reduce dependence on a single 
product/service. 
Acquire market share or position 
Offset seasonal or cyclical fluctuations 
in the present business. 
Enhance the power and prestige of the 
owner, CEO, or management. 
Increase utilisation of present 
resources -- e-g- physical plant, 
individual skills, etc. 
Acquire outstanding management 
or technical personnel. 
Open new markets for present 
products/services. 
SCORE RANK 
18.2 1 
16.9 2 
14.5 3 
14.3 4 
14.2 5 
13.5 6 
11.6 7 
10.5 8 
10.2 9 
9.3 
8.9 
8.5 
10 
12 
12 
Source: W.I. Boucher 
F.T.C. Study 
June 1980 
TABLE 3 
Typology of Acquisitions 
Related Acquisition 
/I 
Unrelated Acquisition 
Guth Bettis 1980  Hall 1982 
Montgomery 1979 
Rumelt 1974 
Strategic 
I 
Inveitment 
I 
I Pure Conqlomerate/Conqlomerate/ 
1 1 Selective Diversification 
Related Complimentary Related Supplementary . ' 
I I I 
'Pekar 1985 
I I I 
Pekar 1985 
Salter & Weinhold 1979 Salter & Weinhold 
I 
I- 
Baker, Miller & Ramsperqer 198 
Poindexter 1970 
Bradley 8 Korn 1982 
Wansley, Lane & Yang 1983 
Reed 1970 
Pekar 1985 
Salter & Weinhold 1979 I 
Allen, Oliver t Schwallie 1981 
Federal Trade Commission 1978 
Allen, Oliver & Allen Oliver L 
Schwallie 1981 Schwallie 1981 
: I 
I 
Vertical Horizontal Concentric Marketing Concentric Technoloe 
I I I I 
Herrman 1976 Chakrabarti t Baker, Miller & Chakrabarti & Burton 
Burton 1983 Ramsperger 1981 1983 
Baker, Miller & Kitching 1967 Baker, Miller t 
Ramsperqer 1981 Pofidexter 1970 Ramsperqer 1981 
Kitchinq 1967 Reed 1970 Kitchinq 1967 
Kitchinq 1967 Poindexter 1970 Herrman 1976 Poindexter 1970 
Poindexter Reed 1970 Reed 1970 
Herrman 1976 Hernnan 1976 
Reed 1970 
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